Limiting  Public Morality  Exceptions to Free Movement in Europe:  Ireland\u27s Role in a Changing European Union by O\u27Connor, David
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 22 | Issue 3 Article 5
4-1-1997
Limiting "Public Morality" Exceptions to Free
Movement in Europe: Ireland's Role in a Changing
European Union
David O'Connor
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
David O'Connor, Limiting "Public Morality" Exceptions to Free Movement in Europe: Ireland's Role in a Changing European Union, 22
Brook. J. Int'l L. 695 (1997).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol22/iss3/5
LIMITING "PUBLIC MORALITY"
EXCEPTIONS TO FREE MOVEMENT IN
EUROPE: IRELAND'S ROLE IN A
CHANGING EUROPEAN UNION
"A state without the means of some change
is without the means of conservation."
- Edmund Burke
I. INTRODUCTION
Ireland's membership in the European Union (EU) has
been a boon to the nation, yet membership has its concessions.
In Ireland, and indeed in all Member States, the tensions be-
tween domestic law and EU-wide law have been hotly debated,
as far back as the inception of the Community in 1944.' What
began from the wreckage of post-war western Europe as an
economic alliance for survival has become a thriving, if bureau-
cratic,' fifteen-member political union on a scale rivaling the
1. The founding of the European Economic Community began formally with
three treaties in the 1950s. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COiaNTY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-1) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND
STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY];
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY]. However, these treaties often
overshadow the real founding of the movement toward European cooperation,
which began with the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg) as governments in exile in London during World War II. These three na-
tions agreed on a post-war plan for further integration, beginning with the estab-
lishment of a customs union. See John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The
European Union: Where Is It Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 923, 926 (1996). This early
attempt at a customs union in Europe, combined with the United States' Mar-
shall Plan for the economic reconstruction of the European landscape, planted the
early seeds that brought forth the EEC Treaty, the ECSC Treaty, and the
Euratom Treaty. For an in-depth discussion of the early interaction among these
three countries, and the effects of the Marshall Plan in Europe, see D. LASOK &
KLP.E. LASOK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 6-10 (6th ed.
1994); WALTER LIPGENS, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1945-1947, at 488-
569 (P.S. Fall & A.J. Ryder trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1982) (1977).
2. European bureaucracy is a thing of legend-it is caused mainly by the re-
quirement that all official documents be published in every official language of the
EU. See LASOK & LASOK, supra note 1, at 249. There are currently eleven official
languages in the EU: Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek,
Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish, with the Irish language considered a
semi-official language. See EUR. CT. JUSTICE R.P. arts. 29, 68. However, this num-
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nascent United States.' Increasingly, this economic and politi-
cal union has asserted its influence over social policies in the
Member States, and this sway is disproportionately felt in the
smaller, poorer Member States of the EU.
Ireland, as one of the poorest nations in the EU,4 is at
odds with its own past. While it appreciates and could hardly
subsist without the economic benefits bestowed upon it by
virtue of its membership in the EU,5 the concomitant social
tide of change brought from increased contact with the conti-
nent has fundamentally and permanently changed the histori-
cal conservatism and Catholicism of Ireland. This unexpected
side-effect of an international agreement was likely overlooked
by Ireland in 19736 as it vied for economic stability in an in-
creasingly competitive global market. Despite Ireland's at-
tempts to limit the social side-effects of EU membership,7 Ire-
land has failed to maintain complete sovereignty. Yet this is
the necessary result, as this Note proposes, in light of the
global economy that has developed since Ireland joined the
European Economic Community in 1973. To compete in the
ber is expected to rise in the coming years, as former Soviet bloc countries join
the EU. See Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Initial Europe Agreements with EU, EC
UPDATE, Apr. 27, 1995, at 10.
3. The fifteen Member States of the European Union are: Austria, Belgium,
Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. See JAIES D. DINNAGE & JOHN F.
MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 9 (1996).
4. See Radek Sikorski, The New Shape of Europe, NAT'L REV., Dec. 27,
1993, at 26, 27. Spain, Portugal, and Greece are also frequently named as the
poorest nations in the EU. See David Gow, Germany and France Back Widening
EC, GUARDIAN, Dec. 5, 1992, at 13; Sikorski, supra, at 27; Murray Ritchie, EC
Funds Won by Blarney to be Shared by Jingle Jangle, HERALD (Glasgow), July 12,
1993, at 18. Boosting the economies of the poorer Member States is one of the
fundamental tenets of the EU. The EU is obligated under the Treaty Establishing
the European Community to ensure the harmonious economic development of the
Member States as a whole by "reducing the differences existing between the vari-
ous regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions ... ." TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, preamble, O.J. (C 224) 1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
5. See Ritchie, supra note 4, at 18 ("[W]ithout the EC, Ireland's economy
would have been washed down the [river] Liffey years ago.").
6. Along with Britain and Denmark, Ireland joined the European Community
in 1973. See GEORGE A. BERmANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 11 (1993).
7. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
8. See Renato Ruggiero, The State of World Trade, Trade Policy and the
WTO, WTO FOcus, Dec. 1996, at 4. The global economy has become highly com-
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global market, Ireland must submit to the continuing central-
ization, and indeed federalization, of Europe.
As one method of encouraging the continued federalization
of the EU, this Note proposes that the European Commission
advance legislation requiring Member States to harmonize the
way in which they determine public morality exceptions to free
trade Clear rules concerning public morality will solidify the
gains made in recent years by promoting an ever closer Union,
and will insure that countries like Ireland cohere to the de-
mands of the Union.
Part II of this Note traces Ireland's steps to membership
in the European Community, and illustrates how the EU has
gradually centralized and placed barriers on Member States'
autonomy. It examines indirect European attempts to thwart
religious-driven, Irish domestic methods of restricting individu-
al rights granted by every other EU Member State, including
the right to divorce and remarry, and the right to early termi-
nation of pregnancy in certain situations. To this end, Part II
discusses the history of the synergy between church and state
in Ireland, and the significant breakdown of that relationship
due in part to Ireland's membership in the EU.
Part III begins with a general discussion of European
efforts to harmonize many of the laws and trading policies of
the Member States, followed by an assessment of judicial inter-
pretations of public morality exceptions to free trade, and the
potential to harmonize these exceptions. It proposes that in the
interest of continued integration, the EU should solidify the
cohesive gains made through its restrictions on Ireland, as de-
petitive in the last 25 years, and some commentators claim that Europe is falling
behind other trading blocs, particularly the North American Free Trade Agreement
countries (currently Canada, Mexico, and the United States) and the trading part-
ners in the Pacific Rim. See, e.g., Terence Roth, Gordian Knot: To Achieve Real
Competitiveness, the EU Will First Have to Win Concessions from its Most Comfort-
able Citizens, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1994, at Al.
9. Free trade among Member States is a requirement under the EU frame-
work as one method of approximating Member State laws. Articles 30-34 of the
EC Treaty prohibit quotas, or quantitative restrictions, among Member States. EC
TREATY arts. 30-34. Article 32 goes further by requiring Member States to refrain
from imposing measures having the "equivalent effect" of a quota. Id. art. 32,
para. 1. However, article 36 currently provides that articles 30-34 "shall not pre-
clude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit" that are
justified, inter alia, on grounds of public morality. Id. art. 36. This exception to
free trade, though, has been somewhat narrowly interpreted. See infra Part III.B.
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lineated in Part II.
Part IV continues with the proposal that one of the best
means of solidifying these gains would be through a Council-
adopted Public Morality directive,10 calling for a Community-
wide concept of the boundaries of public morality. In this way,
the EU can identify the limits of the sovereign concessions
granted to Member States, including Ireland. Additionally, the
directive would dramatically improve (and some might argue
create) the Community conscience. This directive would help to
push the Community past a period in which it vacillates be-
tween an impotent bloc of trading partners and a closer, more
federalized Union.
II. THE PRESSURE TO CHANGE IN IRELAND: EUROPEAN LIMITS
TO THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF IRELAND'S MORALITY LAWS
The small island of Ireland has seen extraordinary change
in this twentieth century. Sporadically through the first two
decades, uprisings at times large, at times small, attempted to
free the country from centuries of British control." Finally, in
1921, after several years of intensified clashes between the
British Army and Irish forces, Britain capitulated, and agreed
to grant independence to a provisional, independent Irish gov-
ernment.' 2 However, the new government, fearing a lack of
10. Procedurally, a directive is drafted by the European Commission, which
then passes the proposed directive to the Council. The Council, if it agrees with
the proposal, then issues the directive to all Member States, on whom the direc-
tive is binding. See RALPH H. FoLsoM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 38-39 (2d ed. 1995).
Directives are distinguishable from regulations passed by the Council. Regulations
are directly effective on Member States, and therefore require no implementation
procedures by the Member States. See id. at 87. In contrast, directives leave to
the Member States the power to implement the directive by whatever means the
Member States choose. See id. at 37. In addition, Member States are given a
grace period in which to adopt the directive. See EC TREATY art. 189, paras. 2-3;
see also BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 166-67. For an example of a typical
grace period, see Council Directive 641221/EEC, art. 10, 1963-1964 O.J. SPEC. ED.
117, 119, which states that Member States "shall within six months of notification
of this Directive put into force the measures necessary to comply with its provi-
sions and shall forthwith inform the [European] Commission thereof." Id. This
directive is more fully discussed in Part III.C of this Note.
11. Official British occupation began with the Norman invasion of Ireland in
1169, led by Strongbow, Earl of Pembroke. For an account of this epoch, see EOIN
MAcNEILL, PHASES OF IRISH HISTORY 300-22 (1920); Katharine Simms, The Nor-
man Invasion and the Gaelic Recovery, in OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF IRE-
LAND 53, 54-57 (R.F. Foster ed., 1989).
12. See R.F. FOSTER, MODERN IRELAND 1600-1972, at 502-03 (Penguin Books
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trading partners if ties with Britain were completely severed,
agreed to remain a member of the British Commonwealth "for
'purposes of common concern. '""3 This economic rationale for
continued social and political association with Britain lasted
until 1949, when Ireland officially became a Republic with full
autonomy. 4
During the period of 1921-1949, the overwhelmingly Ro-
man Catholic nation firmly embraced the synergy of its reli-
gion and politics. 5 The Irish Constitution, passed in 1937 and
still in effect today, is laden with formal allegiances to all
things Catholic. Religion was supreme in this era-the strict
morality of the Church played an everyday role in both the
political makeup of the country and the social mores of its peo-
ple. 6 The vestiges of this high period of Roman Catholic polit-
ical influence are still evident, if waning, in Ireland today.'
Despite the cohesive effects of social and religious autono-
my in Ireland, political and economic autonomy proved diffi-
cult, and in 1973, less than twenty-five years after full inde-
pendence, Ireland once again began seeking dependence (or at
least interdependence) by accepting membership in the Euro-
pean Community 8 (EC). 9 This rapidly advancing communi-
1989) (1988). This agreement created a sharp division in the Irish forces. Certain
concessions had to be made to Britain in order to strike the accord, the most
important of which was an oath of fidelity to Britain, and the continued British
occupation of six counties in the north of Ireland. See id. at 505-06. The resultant
break in Irish ranks led to civil war in Ireland from 1921-1923, and in fundamen-
tal ways planted the seeds of the current troubles in Northern Ireland. For a
thorough discussion of the nascent Irish Free State, see generally JOSEPH M.
CURRAN, THE BiRTH OF THE IRiSH FREE STATE 1921-23 (1980).
13. David Fitzpatrick, Ireland Since 1870, in OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
IRELAND, supra note 11, at 213, 251.
14. See FOSTER, supra note 12, at 566. Even this declaration of full separation
was tempered by continued trade preference agreements with Britain. See id.
15. See id. at 520, 534.
16. During this period, the Catholic Church brought forth its full weight of
morality on the public, establishing, with official government sanction, social pro-
grams for "Catholic Action," which were enforced by Catholic lay organizations
such as the Knights of St. Columbanus and the Legion of Mary. Any group or
activity which violated the "public morality" was hounded. See Fitzpatrick, supra
note 13, at 264-65.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See IR. CONST. art. 29.4.3. This article of the Irish Constitution, inserted
in 1972, provides that "[n]o provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted,
acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of
membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures
adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of law
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ty, now known as the EU following the adoption of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU)" at Maastricht, Netherlands in
1992, has brought fundamental change to Ireland. Obligations
under this treaty have forced changes unimaginable during the
high period of Church dominance. The examination of this
transformation begins with an analysis of the challenges to
Irish sovereignty brought by court decisions concerning a divi-
sive issue in public morality: Abortion.
A. Tensions Between Ireland and the European Union:
Abortion Decisions Challenge Irish Sovereignty
Ireland retains the strictest criminal laws in Europe
against abortion.2 Even in cases of rape or incest, a woman
may not legally obtain an abortion in Ireland. More starkly,
even a pregnant woman with ovarian cancer is compelled to
carry her child to term.2 No other Member State has retained
such a restrictive anti-abortion law. The most conservative of
these countries at the very least grant women the right of
access to an abortion when the life of the mother is threatened.23
in the State." Id.; see J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 187-89 (2d ed. 1984).
19. To avoid confusion, this Note uses the term "EC" to refer to the Commu-
nity and its Member States prior to the signing of the Treaty on European Union
at Maastricht, Netherlands in 1992. The term "EU" is used to refer to the Com-
munity and its Member States after this date.
20. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, tit. I, art. A, para. 1, O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992) [hereinafter TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION].
21. See David Cole, 'Going to England": Irish Abortion Law and the European
Community, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 113, 114 (1993). This is true
despite a recent decision by the Irish Supreme Court that liberalizes access to
information about women's health services abroad. See infra notes 62-65 and ac-
companying text.
22. See Kevin Myers, An Irishman's Diary, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at
13.
23. In Belgium, abortions are legal only in cases of rape or incest, or when
the life of the mother would be endangered .if the pregnancy were carried to term.
See Cole, supra note 21, at 114 n.6; Denis Staunton, Catholic Bishops Face Split
over Response to New Abortion Law, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 26, 1995, at 9. Germany
also has fairly strict laws concerning abortion. In 1995, following several years of
attempts to integrate the conflicting abortion laws of former East and West Ger-
many, the penal code of Germany was altered to criminalize abortion. See
Schwangeren-und Familienhilfebnderungsgesetz [Amending Law Regarding Aid to
Pregnant Women and Families] of June 29, 1995, BR-Drs. 390/95 (amending § 218
para. 1 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB]). Currently, all abortions in Germany are illegal, as
in Ireland, but pregnancies terminated within the first three months go unpun-
ished. See § 218a para. 1 StGB. See generally Detlev W. Belling & Christina
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The criminalization of abortion in Ireland dates back to
pre-independence.' Statutes provided maximum penalties of
life imprisonment for both the provider and the recipient.'
However, in 1983, only ten years after joining the EC, and
fearing the liberalization of abortion laws in other member
nations, Ireland amended its constitution by codifying the
Roman Catholic viewpoint that a fetus is entitled to the right
to life.2" The amendment was inserted into article 40 of the
Irish Constitution, and is referred to as article 40.3.3.27
More recently, the Irish government attempted to assure
its sovereignty by obtaining a reservation to the TEU in 1992.
The Irish Protocol, 28 an attached protocol to both the TEU
and the three original treaties establishing the Economic Com-
munity,29 stipulates that nothing in the TEU should be con-
strued as to "affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3
of the Constitution of Ireland."30
Despite Ireland's attempts to domesticize its stance on
abortion, recent decisions by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities (ECJ or European Court of Justice) and the
European Court of Human Rights have limited the sovereignty
of Ireland in this area.3 In a blow to Ireland's deeply reli-
Eberl, Teenage Abortion in Germany: With Reference to the Legal System in the
United States, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 475, 477-85 (1996). Like Bel-
gium, Germany also permits abortions if necessary to avoid serious physical or
mental impairment to the pregnant woman. See id. at 479.
24. Termination of pregnancy in Ireland was initially a common-law offense.
See Attorney Gen. ex rel. Soc'y for the Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v.
Open Door Counselling Ltd., 1987 I.L.R.M. 477, 479. The earliest criminal statute
prohibiting abortion was enacted in England in 1803. See 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58; see
also Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v.
Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, 1-4686, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, 854 (discussing the ori-
gins of abortion laws in Ireland). A subsequent English statute criminalizing abor-
tion extended its jurisdiction to Ireland. See Offences Against the Person Act,
1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, §§ 58-59.
25. See BRIAN DOOLAN, PRINCIPLES OF IRISH LAW 144 (3d ed. 1991); JAMES
CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 313 n.10 (1987).
26. See IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3. The full text of the amendment reads: "The
State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the
equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right." Id.
27. Id.
28. Protocol Annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 130 [hereinafter Irish
Protocol].
29. See treaties cited supra note 1.
30. Irish Protocol, supra note 28, 1992 O.J. (C 224) at 130.
31. See Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd.
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gious and moralistic condemnation of abortion, the ECJ con-
cluded, in Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland
Ltd. v. Grogan, that women in Ireland have the right to travel
abroad to receive services legally performed in other Member
States, including abortions.32 The ECJ justified its decision
through article 60 of the European Community Treaty (EC
Treaty or Treaty), which sets out the guidelines for "services"
in the Community.33 "Services," the court held, include the
medical termination of a pregnancy, if performed in accordance
with the law of the Member State in which it is carried out.34
Since an abortion is a procedure carried out by a member of
the medical profession, and since the abortion in the Grogan
case was legally performed in England (another Member State
of the Community), Ireland could not prevent the service from
v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 14685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849; Open Door v. Ireland, 246-A
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) (overly broad injunctions preventing access to abor-
tion information not necessary in a democratic society to protect morals); cf Norris
v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1988) (Ireland's criminal prohibition of
same-sex conduct between consenting adults in private not necessary in a demo-
cratic society to protect morals).
32. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-4742, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 893. Prior to the
ECJ's decision, the Irish Supreme Court had attacked the Irish High Court for
even making a referral to the ECJ regarding abortion. Prohibitions on abortions in
Ireland, as the Supreme Court viewed them, were nonjusticiable by tribunals other
than the domestic courts of Ireland. See Society for the Protection of Unborn Chl-
dren Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 760, 765 (Ir. S.C.). While the Supreme Court
could not reverse the High Court's decision to make the referral, it made clear its
view that "where the right sought to be protected is that of a life, there can be no
question of a possible or putative right which might exist in European law as a
corollary to the right to travel so as to avail of services." Id. As an aside, there
can be no question that the Irish Supreme Court failed to look to international
law for guidance on this point. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to which Ireland is a signatory, specifically requires that "[elveryone shall
be free to leave any country, including his own." International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 12(2), SEN. EXEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at
23, 27 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
33. Article 60 provides:
Services shall be considered to be "services" within the meaning of
this Treaty where they are normally provided for remuneration, insofar
as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of move-
ment for goods, capital and persons.
"Services" shall in particular include:
(a) activities of an industrial character;
(b) activities of a commercial character;
(c) activities of craftsmen;
(d) activities of the professions.
EC TREATY art. 60, paras. 1-2 (emphasis added).
34. See Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-4739, [19911 3 C.M.L.R. at 890-91.
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being performed. The ECJ noted:
[Tiermination of pregnancy, as lawfully practised in several
Member States, is a medical activity which is normally pro-
vided for remuneration and may be carried out as part of a
professional activity ....
Consequently, ... medical termination of pregnancy,
performed in accordance with the law of the state in which it
is carried out, constitutes a service within the meaning of
Article 60 of the Treaty.5
In this way, the ECJ, by using an article of the Treaty, could
skirt the moral implications of its decision. This antiseptic ap-
proach to a divisive issue, not only in Ireland but throughout
the world, allowed the court to use an economic rationale 6 for
what was essentially a social and moral decision. 7
Some commentators argue that with the ECJ's decision in
Grogan, Ireland's continuing prohibition of abortion is merely
symbolic.3 1 While this argument is likely valid, a clearer im-
pact of the case is the underlying acceptance of the EU's abili-
ty to legally encroach upon the domestic affairs of Member
States. The court's legal analysis in Grogan uses Community
35. Id.
36. The ECJ reasoned that the termination of a pregnancy is a protected
economic right. See id. at 1-4700 (Report for the Hearing) (section not reprinted in
C.M.L.R.). The court found precedent for this approach in its prior decision in
Luisi v. Ministero del Tesoro. In that case, the court addressed an Italian law that
limited the amount of foreign currency that could be removed from Italy to anoth-
er country. In striking down the law as inconsistent with the EC Treaty, the ECJ
held that articles 59 and 60 protected the freedom both to receive services and to
travel to another Member State to receive services. See Joined Cases 286/82 &
26/83, Luisi v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377, 403, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52,
78.
37. The ECJ dismissed the plaintiffs claims that because of its "gross immo-
rality" abortion should not be viewed as a service. 'Whatever the merits of [the
plaintiffs] arguments on the moral plane, they cannot influence our [decision]. It
is not for the Court to substitute its assessment for that of the legislature in
those Member States where the activities in question are practised legally."
Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-4739, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 890; see Anne M. Hilbert,
Note, The Irish Abortion Debate: Substantive Rights and Affecting Commerce Juris-
prudential Models, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1147 (1994) (asserting that
the ECJ's approach to the case was from the standpoint of the EC's goal of
uninhibited commerce. This approach, Hilbert notes, is in contravention of previous
decisions of Irish courts in the same case, which had used substantive rights anal-
yses to protect the unborn).
38. See Cole, supra note 21, at 117.
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law to supersede the criminal laws of Ireland, and serves to
centralize power in the Community.39 This European power
centralization has been recognized in Ireland, as one commen-
tator notes:
Sovereign parliaments and sovereign courts do not like to
admit the limit of their writ is shrinking. Once, what the
DAW40 ruled upon could then be the legitimate area of scruti-
ny by our courts. But we know there are other courts to rule
over our courts-and more to the point, there are simply the
practices of the broader political and moral culture to which
we have appended ourselves.4'
The recognition of this fact, and its implicit acceptance, brings
Europe one step closer to federalism.42
At the same time, putting aside the question of whether
the ECJ's decision in Grogan was legally sound in a jurispru-
dential sense, one must look at the jurisdictional question
raised by the court's intrusion into the criminal laws of a
Member State, an area of law traditionally reserved to Member
States.
The court's jurisdiction played a central role in another
criminal case that reached the ECJ, having originated in the
domestic courts of Germany.4" The case, Criminal Proceedings
39. Many people in Ireland do not view this power centralization as an awful
notion. Indeed, vocal sentiment has been sounded to scrap completely the current
Irish Constitution and start anew, by creating a constitution unimaginable in
1937-a constitution that explicitly recognizes the supranational nature of Ire-
land's association with the EU. See, e.g., Sean Marlow, Constitutional Crusade
Needed, AN POBELACHT (visited Jan. 27, 1997) <httpl/www.utexas.edu/students/iig/
archive/aprn/95/Augustl7/lett.html> (advocating a complete revision of the 1937
constitution).
40. The DO1 is the Irish Parliament. See infra note 71.
41. Kevin Myers, An Irishman's Diary, IRIsH TmEs, May 5, 1995, at 15.
42. See DINNAGE & MURPHY, supra note 3, at xix. The supremacy of Commu-
nity law over national law is not set forth in the EC Treaty itself. Rather, the
ECJ established early on a doctrine upholding the primacy of Community law. In
a 1964 case, the ECJ held that a provision of Community law must of necessity
prevail over a conflicting provision in the national law of any Member State. See
Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per LEnergia Elettrica (ENEL) [National Elec-
tric Board], 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593-95, 1964 C.M.L.R. 425, 455-56. The importance
of this judicially created supremacy doctrine cannot be underestimated; without it,
the Community never would have advanced to its current state of integration, and
its absence would have placed the potential for a federalized EU beyond reach.
43. Domestic courts of the Member States often find occasion to refer matters
to the ECJ for preliminary rulings. Under article 177 of the EC Treaty, any "court
704 [Vol. MXI:3
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Against Casati,4 reveals the growing but indirect centraliza-
tion spurred on by harmonization goals as contemplated in the
EC Treaty.45 The defendant, Guerrino Casati, was charged
with violating German border monetary declaration rules.46
Although the case centered directly on criminal law, the ECJ
utilized a harmonization argument in striking down the law.
The court stated:
In principle, criminal legislation and the rules of crimi-
nal procedure are matters for which Member States are still
responsible. However, it is clear from a consistent line of
cases decided by the Court, that Community law also sets
certain limits in that area as regards the control measures
which it permits the Member States to maintain in connec-
tion with the free movement of goods and persons. The ad-
ministrative measures or penalties must not go beyond what
is strictly necessary, the control procedures must not be con-
ceived in such a way as to restrict the freedom required by
the Treaty and they must not be accompanied by a penalty
which is so disproportionate to the gravity of the infringe-
ment that it becomes an obstacle to the exercise of that free-
dom.47
In its response to the German court's inquiry, the ECJ correct-
ly validated jurisdictional intrusion into domestic law for pur-
poses of solidifying the impact of the Treaty. Specifically, the
court seemed to be asserting that the exceptions to the free
flow of goods, persons, and (presumably) services, permitted by
or tribunal" of a Member State is permitted to request a ruling from the ECJ if,
inter alia, the court or tribunal believes that an interpretation of the EC Treaty is
necessary to render judgment. See EC TREATY art. 177, paras. 1(a), 2. In addition,
the highest court or tribunal of a Member State must bring an issue before the
ECJ if a case requires interpretation of the Treaty and there is no judicial remedy
under national law. See id. art. 177, para. 3. See generally Alexander John
MacKenzie Stuart, The Court of Justice of the European Communities: The Scope
of its Jurisdiction and the Evolution of its Case Law Under the EEC Treaty, 3
Nw. J. INTt L. & Bus. 415 (1981).
44. Case 203/80, Criminal Proceedings Against Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365.
45. See EC TREATY art. 100 (as amended 1992) ("The Council shall . .. issue
directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative pro-
visions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of
the common market.").
46. See Casati, 1981 E.C.R. at 2598, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 371-72.
47. Id. at 2618, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 396.
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various articles of the EC Treaty," must comply with the
principle of proportionality.49
Proportionality is a general principle of international
law.5" In the context of free trade, and in order to achieve the
objectives set out in the treaties, the principle of proportionali-
ty requires Member States invoking these exceptions, as a
justification for impeding the free flow of goods, do so only to
the extent to which it is justified.5' Under the ECJ's inter-
pretation, a measure is justified if it is "necessary, and no
more than is necessary," to achieve the desired result.52 Fur-
thermore, no measure can be justified as necessary merely
because it is beneficial to the Member State, or is simply a
measure that is designed primarily to reduce public expendi-
tures or lighten administrative burdens."
It is unfortunate that the ECJ, in its assessment of the
Grogan case, was unable to recall the proportionality dictum in
Casati, and use it to validate further its jurisdictional right to
tinker with the criminal laws of Ireland involving abortion.
Had the court been able to use this dictum, it could have es-
tablished a minimum level of rights for women's access to
abortions, to which Ireland could certainly add, but which it
could not take away.
However, the court was unable to do so. Because of the
Irish Protocol,54 no EU law may impede the efforts of the
Irish government to protect fetal rights (or to subvert women's
rights, depending on one's point of view). However, despite
this inability, the EU has arguably eviscerated much of the
meaning of the Protocol, with a declaration of the High Con-
tracting Parties adopted after Ireland had signed the TEU, but
48. Limiting free trade based on public morality objections is currently one
method. See supra note 9.
49. See John Temple Lang, The Sphere in Which Member States Are Obliged
to Comply with the General Principles of Law and Community Fundamental Rights
Principles, 2 LEGAL ISSUES EU. INTEGRATION 23, 27 (1991).
50. See id. at 23 n.1.
51. See Case 153/78, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany (Re Health
Control on Imported Meat), 1979 E.C.R. 2555, 2564, [19801 1 C.M.L.R. 198, 207
(1979); JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EC LAW 109 (4th ed. 1994).
52. STEINER, supra note 51, at 109.
53. See id.; see also Case 104/75, Officier Van Justitie v. De Peijper, 1976
E.C.R. 613, 636, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 271, 304 (utilizing similar language to limit
Member State justifications).
54. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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prior to its entry into force. The Declaration states:
The High Contracting Parties to the Treaty on European
Union[,] ... [h]aving considered the terms of [the Irish Proto-
col] ... [hiereby give the following legal interpretation: That
it was and is their intention that the Protocol shall not limit
freedom to travel between Member States or, in accordance
with conditions which may be laid down, in conformity with
Community law, by Irish legislation, to obtain or make avail-
able in Ireland information relating to services lawfully avail-
able in Member States.5
These measures by the European Union to date have been
somewhat effective in defining the boundaries of Ireland's
sovereignty, but the efforts of the EU have been complemented
by fundamental legal shifts within Ireland itself. These shifts
are discussed in the following section.
B. Changes from Within: The Right of Access to Abortion
Information Abroad
Not all of the changes in Irish society have been forced
upon it by an intrusive supranational governing body on the
Continent. Irish citizens have created changes at home. For
example, to cement the effects of the litigation in Grogan, the
Irish electorate passed by a wide margin the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution, protecting a woman's right to
information about abortion services in other EU states.55 This
was a clear victory for women's rights advocates, and a reaf-
firmation that Irish citizens felt inclined to liberalize further
Irish law.57 In addition, the vote underscored the slippery
55. Declaration of the High Contracting Parties to the Treaty on European
Union, adopted at Gumarbes (Port.), May 1, 1992, reprinted in 1 EUROPEAN UN-
ION: SELECTED INSTRUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE TREATIES 67 (1993) (emphasis add-
ed).
56. See Geraldine Kennedy, Amendment on Abortion Defeated by 2-1 Majority,
IRISH TIMES, Nov. 28, 1992, at 1 (reporting that although a referendum to legalize
abortion failed, the Irish electorate widely embraced a measure to ensure access to
information about women's health services abroad); Carol Coulter, Pro-Life Cam-
paign to Lobby Politicians Against Bill, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995, at 4.
57. The extent of the liberalization, however, should not be exaggerated. An
amendment failed that same year, which would have legalized abortions in Ireland
when the life of the mother was in danger, or in cases of rape or incest. See Ken-
nedy, supra note 56, at 1. Note however, that this referendum took place prior to
ratification of the TEU.
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hold the Church has in Ireland; its rigorous campaign from the
pulpit against the referendum met with defeat.
The wording of the amendment left little doubt about the
new direction in Ireland. It provided that article 40.3.358
"shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the
State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law,
information relating to services lawfully available in another
State."59 This paved the way for the Irish legislature constitu-
tionally to enact legislation protecting the right of a woman to
receive information on abortions abroad.
The momentum to solidify this right culminated in May
1995 with the Regulation of Information Bill (Information Bill
or Bill).60 The Information Bill codified into legislation the
wording of the fourteenth amendment. However, the Bill re-
quired that the information must not "advocate or promote...
the termination of pregnancy."6 Despite this dilution, the Bill
was challenged by fetal rights advocates, who overlooked the
democratic notions of unity by consent and contested the Bill
on constitutional grounds. The historically conservative Su-
preme Court seemed certain to strike down the Bill as an un-
constitutional violation of natural law, a view the court had
repeatedly espoused.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Ireland upheld the
validity of the Bill,62 in what is widely viewed as one of the
most important opinions handed down by an Irish court in the
modern era.6' In its opinion, the court rejected the traditional
natural law theory which had legitimated its conservative,
58. See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text.
59. IR. CONST. amend. XIV.
60. Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of
Pregnancies) Bill, No. 108 (1995) (Ir.) [hereinafter Information Bill] (codified as
Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnan-
cies) Act, No. 5 (1995) [hereinafter Information Act]); see Kristin E. Carder, Note,
Liberalizing Abortion in Ireland. In re Article 26 and the Passage of the Regulation
of Information (Services Outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Bill,
3 TULSA J. COMP. & INt' L. 253 (1996).
61. Information Bill, supra note 60, § 3(1)(a)(v)(II) (codified as Information Act,
supra note 60, § 3(iv)).
62. See In re Article 26 of the Constitution and in re the Reference to the
Court of the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination
of Pregnancies) Bill, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 81, 115-16 (Ir. S.C.) [hereinafter In re Arti-
cle 26].
63. See, e.g., William Binchy, Abortion Ruling One of the Most Significant
Legal Decisions Since the Foundation of State, IRISH TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 12.
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religion-based opinions in the past." It stressed:
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution [cannot]
be disregarded on the ground that it [is] inconsistent with
natural law. It is permissible for the people to exercise the
power to amend the Constitution provided for in Article 46 in
a manner which [is] inconsistent with natural law. Natural
law is not antecedent and superior to the Constitution....
The Constitution, as amended by the fourteenth amendment,
constitute[s] the fundamental and supreme law of the
State.5
This notion of "natural law" had previously been used by
the Irish Courts to strike down attempts to liberalize or secu-
larize areas of the Irish Constitution. Natural law typically
translated into "canonical law," and legislative proposals which
ran contrary to Catholic doctrine were consistently found to be
repugnant to the Constitution."
In its abandonment of natural law,67 it could very well be
64. See In re Article 26, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. at 83. For an example of this con-
servative, moralistic approach of the past, see Attorney Gen. ex rel. Soc'y for the
Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 1988 I.R.
593 (Ir. H. Ct.), in which the High Court of Ireland invoked natural law in its
refusal to allow a family planning clinic to alert Irish women to the legality and
availability of abortion services abroad. Id. at 614. The Information Bill was large-
ly a reaction to the hostility shown by the Supreme Court to any liberalization of
women's access to family planning information, which makes the court's about-
face decision in In re Article 26 all the more important.
65. In re Article 26, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. at 83; see id. at 107-08.
66. See Paul W. Butler & David L. Gregory, A Not So Distant Mirror: Fed-
eralism and the Role of Natural Law in the United States, the Republic of Ireland,
and the European Community, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 444-45 (1992).
Butler and Gregory argue that the Irish judiciary has frequently relied on the
jurisprudence of St. Thomas Aquinas in attempting to interpret the Irish Constitu-
tion as an embodiment of the principle that the state should be a mechanism of
the "higher law" of God. See id. at 446. "Under Thomism, a judge should apply
judicial reason to derive political truths from the eternal law of God. Natural law
is the link between the eternal law and the positive moral law." Id.
67. For an equally stunning recent decision by the Irish Supreme Court, by
virtue of its abandonment of traditional natural law principles, see In re a Ward
of Court, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 401. The facts of the case are remarkably similar to
the United States case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990), in which the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the family of an individual in a vegetative state has a right to terminate the
individual's life support systems. In the Irish case, the Irish Supreme Court took
the opposite position, and granted the family's request. See In re a Ward of
Court, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. at 429-30. This example of the recent liberalization of the
Irish court can be viewed as yet another example of the direct impact of judicial
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that the court was capitulating to the requirements of the
Community.68 Left to its own authority, the court likely would
have relied upon its typical natural law assessment, finding
the Bill repugnant to the Constitution because of its violation
of natural law. Instead, the Irish Court, perhaps mindful of
ECJ decisions in the past, bowed to the will of the people.69
The court's ruling could well be a sort of appeasement mea-
sure to the ECJ and other Member States, and an indication of
a future narrow interpretation of the Irish Protocol of
Maastricht.7"
It is important to note that the Information Bill was
passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas,7 and not on the
initiation of women's rights advocates.72 This legislative ac-
tivism is in stark contrast to traditional notions of harmony be-
tween the Irish state and the Church; indeed, the Church
vehemently castigated both the legislators for proposing the
Bill and the Supreme Court for finding the Bill constitution-
al.73 Similar opposition, this time to ending the ban on di-
interaction with Europe.
68. The ruling by the Irish Supreme Court in May 1995, upholding the con-
stitutionality of the Information Bill was a brave step by the Irish Court, in that
it went directly against both the teachings and the urgings of the Catholic
Church. Yet, in many ways, its decision may seem somewhat outdated in the not
too distant future. New forms of media, particularly computer networks like the
Internet, are bringing all sorts of information to Ireland in quantities and speeds
that make regulation of the information impossible. See Myers, supra note 41, at
15. The court may have merely upheld a law that codifies a stern but unenforce-
able rule, since anyone outside its jurisdiction is free to post with impunity any
manner of information about abortion, including information that "advocate[s] or
promote[s] ... the termination of pregnancy." Information Bill, supra note 60, §
3(1)(a)(v)(U) (codified as Information Act, supra note 60, § 3(iv)). The courts would
no doubt have jurisdiction to punish citizens who access the information, but prob-
lems with this exist. First, it is extremely difficult, given Ireland's impoverished
situation, to justify or fund the regulation necessary to apprehend citizens who
access the illegal information. Furthermore, the original criminal law banning
abortion information in Ireland targeted the information provider, not the recipient
of that information. See In re Article 26, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. at 90 (citing Attorney
Gen. ex re. Soc'y for the Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Open Door
Counselling Ltd., 1988 I.R. 593 (Ir. H. Ct.)).
69. See In re Article 26, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. at 90-91, 102-03.
70. Irish Protocol, supra note 28.
71. See In re Article 26, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. at 90. The Oireachtas is the nation-
al parliament of Ireland. Somewhat comparable to the House of Commons and
House of Lords in Britain, the Oireachtas is comprised of the Dd.il ]tireann and
the Seanad Pireann. See DOOLAN, supra note 25, at 13, 17-21.
72. Doubtless, though, women's rights groups lobbied heavily for the Bill.
73. See Andy Pollak, Hierarchy Criticises Supreme Court, IRISH TIzES, July 1,
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vorce, was raised by the Church throughout the fall of 1995,
and ended in yet another defeat for the Church.74
C. Ireland and the Roman Catholic Church
The thread running through this discussion is the waning
influence of the Church in Ireland. The erosion began with
Ireland's acceptance into the European Community in
1973,7 and since then the Church's influence has steadily
decreased. Arguably, there is only room for one form of supra-
national law, and, with the increasing influence of European
1995, at 8.
74. On November 24, 1995, a majority of the citizens of Ireland voted to
adopt a government-supported constitutional amendment to end the ban on di-
vorce. See James F. Clarity, Irish Vote to End the Divorce Ban By a Tiny Margin,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1995, at Al. This historic vote signals the further erosion of
the synergy between Church and State in Ireland. Indeed, the vote is yet another
example of the profound social changes in Ireland as a direct result of Ireland's
membership in the more socially liberal European Union-Ireland is the last EU
Member State to legalize divorce. See Anna Margaret McDonough, Comment, When
Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling-Legalizing Divorce in Ireland, 14 Dic. J. INTL L. 647,
647 (1996).
The concept of divorce, while neither a "good" nor a "service" under the EC
Treaty, and therefore not directly applicable to the discussion in the main text, is
still an important element in the social fabric of Irish and European life. Thus, it
is briefly described here.
Divorce in ancient Ireland was oddly more liberal than it is in Ireland
today, even after the recent decision to end its prohibition. Brehon law, the an-
cient doctrine of Irish law, was enforced by the Brehon judges, nomadic arbiters
who traveled Ireland. See PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW, THE IRISH JUDICIARY 52 (1971).
According to Brehon law, on the first day of every February, either husband or
wife could choose to walk away from the marriage. See MARY DOWLING DALEY,
IRISH LAWS 55 (1989). However, since the introduction of Christianity to Ireland,
divorce has been illegal.
Modern divorce laws in Ireland did not follow their liberal British counter-
parts, despite the lasting influence of English law in Ireland. Rather, the Roman
Catholic ban on divorce had been the official law of the state since its inception.
See McDonough, supra, at 649. This ban was codified in article 41.3.2 of the Con-
stitution, which stated: "No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dis-
solution of marriage." IR. CONST. art. 41.3.2 (repealed 1995). This provision is now
superseded by the fifteenth amendment, as adopted by the people on November
24, 1995. Id. amend. XV. The amendment permits spouses to divorce if they have
lived apart for at least four years and there is no prospect of reconciliation. Id.
Importantly, the Irish Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the
amendment, exhibiting the court's new-found disdain for reliance on natural law.
See In re the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution (No. 2) Bill, [1996] 2
I.L.R.M. 161 (Ir. S.C. June 12, 1996) (LEXIS, Ireind Library, Cases File). This
brings Ireland into line with every other Member State in the EU.
75. See FOSTER, supra note 12, at 569 & n.1.
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law in Ireland, canonical law has been pushed aside.
The unraveling of the Church's influence in Ireland can
perhaps be traced to the 1972 repeal of the constitutionally
recognized, semi-governmental role of the Church in Ireland.
The repealed article recognized "the special position of the
Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of
the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens."76
Although the article's repeal was the result of a combination
of factors, the Irish accession to the EC, one year following
repeal, was likely an important factor. Politicians at the time
were particularly interested in pointing to the compatibility of
Ireland's system of government with the EC, mindful, as they
were, of the economic windfall that would come with accep-
tance into the EC.77
This is not to say, of course, that Ireland has successfully
separated church from state, or indeed wishes to.78 Nonethe-
less, repealing the mandate of a role for the Church in the
hierarchy of government fundamentally changed the Church's
position in the structure of Irish society.79 Twenty-five years
after the repeal, priests in Ireland hold far less sway, having
supported and lost several major socially conservative cam-
paigns in the late 1980s and early 1990s." In addition, cor-
ruption and scandal within the Church itself has created a
backlash against its leaders."'
The Church nevertheless continues to wield power in this
76. IR. CONST. art. 44.1.2 (repealed 1972); see FOSTER, supra note 12, at 595.
77. See Butler & Gregory, supra note 66, at 444. Butler and Gregory conclude
that despite the judicial skirmishes over abortion between Irish courts and the
ECJ, the Irish government "strongly supported approval of the [Treaty on Europe-
an Union] because the European Community annually provides hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in subsidies to Ireland's devastated economy." Id. Arguably, the
Irish government reacted similarly when faced with the prospect of EC subsidies
in 1973.
78. For instance, the Irish Constitution continues to retain a provision requir-
ing that the State "respect and honour religion." IR. CONST. art. 44.1.
79. See Butler & Gregory, supra note 66, at 445-46.
80. The Church's failed anti-divorce campaign in 1995 is merely the most re-
cent. See supra note 74.
81. The Church has officially recognized the extent of its internal problems.
Some of the most damaging and well-known of these problems are the charges of
sexual molestation leveled at priests in several parts of the country. In October
1995, meetings between Church officials were held, and a public statement issued,
acknowledging the problems within the Church and promising reform. See James
F. Clarity, Ireland's Catholic Hierarchy Confronts Sex Abuse of Children, N.Y.
TniEs, Oct. 19, 1995, at All.
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small nation. Indeed, the preamble of the Constitution invokes
the "Holy Trinity" and humbly acknowledges the people of
Ireland's "obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ,"82 and
this is often followed in judicial opinions citing to the Constitu-
tion.'
III. THE PUBLIC MORALITY DOCTRINE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE PRECEDENT FOR HARMONIOUS APPROACHES TO
IT
As Part II illustrates, the EU is capable of a certain
amount of intrusion into the domestic affairs of its Member
States. However, as the Irish Protocol attests, this power is
82. The full text of the preamble is telling, in that it invokes the religious
fervor of the period in which the Constitution was enacted, in 1937, less than 15
years after the liberation of the Irish state. The preamble reads:
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority
and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must
be referred,
We, the people of tire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord,
Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to
regain the rightful independence of our Nation,
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of
Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the
individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our
country restored, and concord established with other nations,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.
IR. CONST. preamble.
83. Most pointedly, the Chief Justice of the Irish Supreme Court proclaimed
in 1984:
The preamble to the Constitution proudly asserts the existence of
God in the Most Holy Trinity and recites that the people of Ireland hum-
bly acknowledge their obligation to "our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ." It
cannot be doubted that the people . . .were proclaiming a deep religious
conviction and faith and an intention to adopt a Constitution consistent
with that conviction and faith and with Christian beliefs.
Norris v. Attorney Gen., 1984 I.R. 36, 64 (Ir. S.C.) (O'Higgins, C.J.) (upholding law
prohibiting private, same-sex, consensual conduct), rev'd, Norris v. Ireland, 142
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); see also Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v. Attorney
Gen., 1972 I.R. 1, 23 (Ir. S.C.) (Irish Constitution "reflect[s] a firm conviction that
we [the Irish] are a religious people"); Attorney Gen. ex rel. Soc'y for the Protec-
tion of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 1988 I.R 593, 614
(Ir. H. Ct.) (quoting Norris, 1984 I.R. at 64); Finn v. Attorney Gen., 1983 I.R. 154,
159 (Ir. H. Ct.) (upholding eighth amendment to the Irish Constitution and invok-
ing the preamble); Kennedy v. Ireland, 1987 I.R. 587, 590 (Ir. S.C.) (right to priva-
cy, though not an enumerated constitutional right, is a personal right which flows
from the Christian and democratic nature of the nation).
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limited, and is often not very potent. This problem is com-
pounded by the often ambiguous wording of the EC Treaty and
now the Treaty on European Union. One possible way in which
closer Community cohesion can be achieved, thereby negating
the need for judicial intrusion, would be to harmonize the way
in which Member States approach the issue of public morality.
To this end, Part III.A discusses how the Community can re-
quire Member States to harmonize their laws. Section B dis-
cusses the different interpretations of the phrase "public mo-
rality" as used in article 36 of the EC Treaty. Section C exam-
ines the manner in which the Community has approached the
term "public policy" and shows how the framework for dealing
with public policy issues could be used as precedent for a direc-
tive on public morality. Section D notes the application of pub-
lic morality in other areas of the Community in addition to
article 36, specifically in the European Patent Convention and,
more recently, the Community Patent Convention. Finally,
Part IV is devoted to a discussion of the feasibility, and indeed
the economic necessity, of a public morality directive.
A. Harmonization as a Method of Limiting Member States'
Sovereignty
In its infancy, the task of the Community was embodied in
article 2 of the 1957 EEC Treaty.' This provision included
the Community goal of harmonizing many of the laws of Mem-
ber States. Specifically, article 2 stated that the objective of the
Community was to promote "a harmonious development of
economic activities,""5 in part by "progressively approximating
the economic policies of Member States."86
Article 2 underwent substantial changes when the TEU
was adopted in 1992. Under the TEU, article 2 now requires a
far greater commitment by both the EU and the Member
States to establish policies which further function to harmo-
nize. Article 2 now states that:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a
common market and an economic and monetary union... ,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and
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balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and
non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level
of employment and of social protection, the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social
cohesion and solidarity among Member States.""7
These aims of the Union are reaffirmed in article 3, which
requires both the Community and the Member States to adopt
an economic policy "based on the close coordination of Member
States' economic policies."88 The effect of this more binding
language, while perhaps not its anticipated intent, is to limit
the sovereignty of Member States, and to centralize the Union.
Against this backdrop of the codification of social and
political cohesion are the harmonization attempts of the past.
Increasingly, though at times sporadically, EU laws have been
consolidating and harmonizing the laws of Member States, and
the EU's deceivingly slow accession of political and social
power has led to a state of semi-federalism in Europe." Un-
der article 100 of the revised EC Treaty, the EU may act to
direct the Member States to harmonize certain laws in a man-
ner approximating the laws and regulations of the Communi-
ty.9
0
While much of this harmonization process has focused on
streamlining economic and agricultural policy, there is room
within the harmonization process to address other areas. A
directive offering Member States a guideline by which to deter-
mine whether a "good" violates the European Union's stan-
dards of public morality is a viable area for further harmoniza-
tion. However, before discussing the potential harmonizing
effects of the directive, an analysis of the judicial interpreta-
tion of "public morality" in article 36 is laid out in Section B.
B. Interpretation of Article 36 by the European Court of Justice
The EC Treaty granted certain concessions to Member
States, in an attempt to allay fears that their sovereign laws
would be superseded by European Council directives and deci-
87. EC TREATY art. 2.
88. Id. art. 3a(1).
89. See Gow, supra note 4, at 13.
90. EC TREATY art. 100.
71519971
716 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XXII:3
sions of the European Court of Justice. Interspersed through-
out the treaty are these concessions, one of which allows the
Member States to place limits on the otherwise free movement
of goods."
Article 36 of the EC Treaty allows Member States to pro-
hibit or restrict imports, exports, or goods in transit if the
prohibition or restriction is "justified on grounds of public mo-
rality, public policy or public security... [or for] the protection
of health and life of humans, animals or plants... ,92 How-
ever, the treaty cautions that "[s]uch prohibitions or restric-
tions shall not.., constitute a means of arbitrary discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States."" In interpreting this last sentence, the ECJ has con-
sistently held that article 36 does not constitute a reservation
of sovereignty to the Member States.94 Yet this public mo-
rality justification has been invoked by Ireland and other
Member States to prevent, in good faith or bad, the free move-
ment of goods, one of the fundamental goals of the treaty.
The first opportunity for the ECJ to focus on the public
morality provision of article 36 originated in a referral from an
English court in 1979."5 Regina v. Henn & Darby" involved
an 1876 British customs law which banned the importation of
91. See id. art. 36.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Case 35/76, Simmenthal SpA v. Ministero Delle Finanze [Italian Min-
ister for Finance], 1976 E.C.R. 1871, 1886, [19771 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 15; Case 5/77,
Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale s.r.l., 1977 E.C.R. 1555, 1559, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R.
1, 18 (1977); see also Manfred A. Dauses, The System of the Free Movement of
Goods in the European Community, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 209, 224 (1985).
95. For a procedural discussion of the relationship between Member State
courts and the ECJ, see supra note 43.
96. Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn & Darby, 1979 E.C.R. 3795, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R.
246 (1979). Prior to the decision in this case, a written question to the European
Commission asked for an interpretation of the public morality clause in 1977. See
1977 O.J. (C 265) 8. The question asked whether a Member State which forbade
the rearing and slaughtering of animals in a cruel manner could invoke the public
morality exception of article 36 to prohibit the importation of meat from Member
States which maintained less stringent guidelines on animal slaughter. The Com-
mission ruled that a Member State could not prohibit the importation of such
meat. It reasoned that "any affront to public morals . . .would occur solely in the
country where the cruel treatment takes place and can be witnessed by the local
population, and not in the importing country." Id.; see PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVE-
MENT OF GOODS IN THE EEC 180 n.78 (2d ed. 1988). To remedy the deplorable
conditions of animals, the Commission recommended action on a Community-wide
level. 1977 O.J. (C 265) 9.
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"indecent or obscene articles."97 Defendants were charged with
violating this customs law for importing pornographic films
and magazines featuring child pornography and other acts
contrary to the criminal law of Britain." The pornography
had originated in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. 9 On ap-
peal of their conviction to the House of Lords, and subsequent-
ly to the ECJ,"0' the defendants argued that article 36 of the
EEC Treaty required Britain to have clearly defined rules of
public morality.'0 ' The ECJ upheld Britain's right to main-
tain the customs law and to convict the defendants for its vio-
lation. °2
In interpreting article 36, the ECJ noted that "[iun princi-
ple, it is for each Member State to determine in accordance
with its own scale of values and in the form selected by it the
requirements of public morality in its territory." 3 The court
went on to say:
[Ihf a prohibition on the importation of goods is justifiable on
grounds of public morality and if it is imposed with that pur-
pose the enforcement of that prohibition cannot, in the ab-
sence within the Member State concerned of a lawful trade in
the same goods, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on trade contrary to Article
36.104
In this often-criticized opinion, °5 the court was over-
97. Customs Consolidation Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., ch. 36, § 42 (Eng.). The
Customs Consolidation Act made it a criminal offense for any person to be in any
way knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion or attempted evasion of this
prohibition on importation. Id.
98. See Henn & Darby, 1979 E.C.R. at 3798-99, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. at 249-50.
While child pornography justifiably fell within the scope of this law, far less sordid
material would have also fallen within the broad definition of this customs law.
See LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE
EEC 126 (1985).
99. It is unclear whether the materials were legal in those Member States.
See Regina v. Henn, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1031 (Eng. C.A.).
100. For a brief discussion of the procedural aspects of an individual challenge
to the ECJ, see infra note 119.
101. See Henn & Darby, 1979 E.C.R. at 3801 (not reprinted in C.M.L.R.).
102. See id. at 3817, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. at 275-76.
103. Id. at 3813, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. at 272.
104. Id. at 3815, [19801 1 C.M.L.R. at 274.
105. See, e.g., GOImLEY, supra note 98, at 128 (criticizing the court's depar-
ture from general principles of proportionality, in its failure to consider the
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broad, since it grouped the entire concept of "public morality"
into the confines of child pornography. The "extreme nature of
the materials""6 involved called for a far narrower holding
than the one the court inevitably gave. The court therefore
gave an inadequate delineation of the contours of the public
morality clause. Because the concept of "public morality" was
hitched to such extreme derogations from that concept, future
assessments of the morality clause were consequently tied to
the facts of Henn & Darby. The court instead should have
chosen to limit its ruling to the facts of the case, and waited
until a more moderate assessment of the public morality clause
could be given.
Furthermore, in this assessment, the court conceded ex-
travagant power to each Member State, because the decision
essentially undermines the text of article 36. If no check is
placed on the extent to which a Member State can arbitrarily
invoke the public morality clause based on the Member
State's own, often obscure, laws, then the line between bad
faith use and good faith use of the clause is blurred, and arti-
cle 36 is rendered essentially meaningless.' 7 Thus, under the
Henn & Darby line of case law, the free movement of goods
may be impeded at the whim of a Member State, in direct
contradiction of the Treaty.
Utilizing the Henn & Darby rationale, Ireland potentially
could invoke the provisions of article 36 in two distinct man-
disproportionality of the risk avoided by the law and the burden placed on viola-
tors of the law); Dauses, supra note 94, at 226 (interpreting the Henn & Darby
decision so narrowly as to be confined to its facts). The opinion has also been crit-
icized for misconstruing the facts-as it happens, England maintained different
standards of determining indecency and obscenity, standards which favored English
citizens. The Customs Consolidation Act prohibited the importation of both obscene
and indecent materials, whereas another English provision prohibited the sale of
obscene, but not indecent, materials. Thus, English vendors were held to a lower
standard, and the discrimination against citizens of other Member States could be
construed as a form of "arbitrary discrimination" prohibited under article 36 of the
EC Treaty. See OLIVER, supra note 96, at 182-83.
106. GORMLEY, supra note 98, at 128.
107. A similar argument was also raised by Rebecca J. Cook to find fault with
some international human rights treaties. She noted that when a treaty lacks
compulsory jurisdiction to determine whether a signatory has failed to meet its
treaty obligations, the treaty is essentially undermined. See Rebecca J. Cook, State
Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
125, 172-73 (1994). So too is the EC Treaty undermined if the obligations under
article 36 are left to the individual determinations of Member States.
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ners. First, the government could use article 36 as an economic
measure disguised as a moral objection. For example, as a
retaliatory measure against Britain for some other trade dis-
pute, Ireland could ban the sale of all contraceptives manufac-
tured in Britain, claiming that their importation violates public
morality. If this were a unilateral measure taken against Brit-
ain, but not against other Member States, who were still free
to export contraceptives to Ireland, it is fairly clear that the
ECJ would find the Irish measure contrary to the spirit of the
Treaty.0 8 Leaving aside the issue of good faith interpretation
of the Treaty, it would be enough for the ECJ to conclude that
Ireland had impeded the free movement of goods. 109 However,
in a second hypothetical situation, if the same measure were
passed in Ireland and applied on a Community-wide basis,
such that imports of contraceptives were banned no matter
where they originated, under the wording of the ECJ's deci-
sion in Henn & Darby, Ireland would be legally invoking its
sovereign right under article 36, to the detriment of the free
movement of goods, and to the detriment of companies in other
Member States. Ireland's ability to do so would undermine
the goal of the unfettered flow of goods,"' and indeed the
goals of "an ever closer union"" and "closer relations be-
tween the States belonging to [the European Community]."'
Yet the Henn & Darby case is not the only ECJ case to
focus on public morality and its relation to article 36. The
Court of Justice readdressed the public morality issue in
Conegate Ltd. v. Her Majesty's Customs & Excise."' As in
Henn & Darby, the facts were titillating. British Customs and
Excise officers seized an importation of inflatable rubber dolls
which were ostensibly crafted as "love dolls.""" Also seized
were various exotic and erotic sexual devices, all of which had
been exported from Germany."5 The goods were seized on the
108. See Henn & Darby, 1979 E.C.R. at 3815, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. at 273-74.
109. Community law mandates the maintenance of the free flow of goods be-
tween Member States. See supra note 9.
110. See EC TREATY art. 30.
111. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION preamble, para. 12.
112. EC TREATY art. 2.
113. Case 121/85, Conegate Ltd. v. Her Majesty's Customs & Excise, 1986
E.C.R. 1007, [19861 1 C.M.L.R. 739.
114. Id. at 1008, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 741.
115. See id. at 1018, [19861 1 C.M.L.R. at 750. As in Henn & Darby, it is not
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grounds that all of them violated British conceptions of public
morality, since the goods were determined by British customs
officials to be "indecent and obscene" under the same customs
law. 6 used in Henn & Darby."' Thus, the British courts as-
serted that the goods were unprotected by article 30 of the EC
Treaty."8 The importers of these products made an article
177 challenge to the ECJ."' They claimed that Britain had
created a two-tiered system which disfavored exporters from
other Member States. Defendants pointed out that similar
goods manufactured in Britain needed only to pass a far less
rigid standard, thus effectuating an "arbitrary discrimina-
tion." °
The ECJ agreed in theory, and held that Britain's prac-
tice was discriminatory, since British officials had created no
general prohibition against goods of this type, nor had they
adopted any serious or effective measures to prevent the distri-
bution of such goods in Britain.'
What can be deduced from the ECJ's reasoning in the
Conegate case is that the court found that Britain's practice
constituted an arbitrary discrimination prohibited under article
36.22 This most recent case dealing with the public morality
clause is far less deferential to Member States than Henn &
Darby, and takes a much stricter view of their attempts to
undermine the unfettered flow of goods in the Community.
Because of this holding, the prospect of simply scrapping the
public morality exception in favor of a Community conception
of public morality becomes all the more viable.
clear in this case whether the goods involved were legal in Germany.
116. Customs Consolidation Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., ch. 36, § 42 (Eng.).
117. See Conegate, 1986 E.C.R. at 1008, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 741.
118. See id.
119. EC TREATY art. 177. This article enables individuals to challenge the deci-
sions of Member States' courts, provided that the individual in question has fully
exhausted the domestic courts of the Member State. However, ultimate discretion
to allow the challenge is left to the court of last resort of the Member State,
which must request a preliminary reference to the ECJ under article 177. See
BER ANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 245-48.
120. Conegate, 1986 E.C.R. at 1018-19, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 750.
121. Id. at 1023, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 753.
122. See OLIVER, supra note 96, at 183-84 (noting that while the ECJ did not
expressly state that the ban constituted an "arbitrary discrimination," the decision
effectively stands for that assertion).
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C. Interpretation of Article 48: Public Policy Versus Public
Morality, and the Precedent for a Public Morality Directive
While article 36 deals solely with public morality as it
relates to the free movement of goods, a similarly worded pro-
vision, article 48, deals with other justifications for limiting
free movement. Under article 48, Member States are permitted
to limit the free movement of workers if "justified on grounds
of public policy, public security, or public health ..... ' Not
included, oddly, is a Member States' ability to limit free move-
ment on the grounds of public morality, as in article 36.
The distinction between "public policy" and "public morali-
ty" is left undefined in the Treaty, but the European Council
did issue a directive in 1964, which clarified the necessary
justification for a public policy exception." The preamble of
this directive noted that "co-ordination [of approaches to the
free movement of persons] presupposes in particular an ap-
proximation of the procedures followed in each Member State
when invoking grounds of public policy. . . .""r The intent of
the directive, then, was to harmonize Member State procedures
yet reserve substantive conclusions of public policy to the
Member States, subject to judicial control.'26
While reiterating the fundamental principle of the EC
Treaty that public policy shall not be invoked for economic
reasons,2' the Public Policy directive created broad guide-
lines within which Member States may operate. For instance,
the directive states that a person's prior criminal conviction
shall not in itself constitute grounds for invoking public poli-
123. EC TREATY art. 48(3). Articles 36 and 56(1) of the Treaty also include the
"public policy" exception, but since they have not been interpreted differently from
article 48, see OLIVER, supra note 96, at 178, they will not be discussed here. But
see GOR LEY, supra note 98, at 129 (positing that "public policy" as used in these
three articles of the EC Treaty could be subject to different interpretations).
124. Council Directive 641221, 1963-1964 O.J. SPEC. ED. 117 [hereinafter Public
Policy directive]. The directive outlined, inter alia, the general contours of the
public policy exception, as well as the diseases and disabilities which justified
limiting the free movement of persons on the basis of public health. However, the
phrase "public policy" is never officially defined in the directive, nor has it ever
been in a Community document.
125. Id. preamble, para. 10.
126. See Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1347, [1975]
1 C.M.L.R. 1, 15.
127. See Public Policy directive, supra note 124, art. 2(2), 1963-1964 O.J. SPEC.
ED. at 118.
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cy." However, like all EC directives, the implementation of
this provision is left to the discretion of Member States.'29
Thus, a Member State may legitimately weigh prior convic-
tions in assessing whether a person is entitled to resident
status, but other reasons must be put forth as well; a Member
State therefore maintains sovereignty, yet its discretionary
power is limited.3 '
Further, article 3 of the directive prohibits utilizing the
public policy exception on grounds other than the personal
conduct of the individual concerned.'3' This provision seems
to parallel the limitations of article 36, which prohibit "arbi-
trary discrimination" by Member States. Finally, the directive
concludes with an Annex listing six categories of diseases and
disabilities which would justify a public policy derogation from
the free movement of persons."2
All of the measures adopted in the directive were deemed
necessary by the Council because the concept of "public policy"
is so vague, and Member States had tended to utilize the justi-
fication to keep out any person deemed undesirable. 3 '
The concept of public morality is likewise a vague concept
in need of clarification. Member States, in particular Ireland
and England, tend to invoke public morality whenever EU law
conflicts with their own approach.' The continued ability of
Member States to invoke the public morality justification thus
undermines the intentions of an "ever closer Union,"' and
128. See id. art. 3(2).
129. See supra note 10.
130. See Van Dayn, 1974 E.C.R. at 1348, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 16.
131. Public Policy directive, supra note 124, art. 3(1), 1963-1964 O.J. SPEC. ED.
at 118.
132. Id. art. 4(1), Annex, 1963-1964 O.J. SPEC. ED. at 118-19.
133. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 488; see also Van Duyn, 1974
E.C.R. 1337, 1347, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 15 (justification of public policy is subject
to judicial control). The ultimate holding in Van Duyn, however, seems in conflict
with the ECJ's later decision in Conegate. In Van Duyn, the court held that the
Public Policy directive permitted restrictions based on public policy if the Member
State considered a person's activities socially harmful, even if those same activities
could be lawfully practiced by citizens of that Member State. Id. at 1352, [1975] 1
C.M.L.R. at 19. In contrast, ten years later the Conegate court held that public
morality could not be invoked as an excuse to prohibit free trade if the imported
goods were legal in the Member State. Case 121185, Conegate Ltd. v. Her Majes-
ty's Customs & Excise, 1986 E.C.R. 1007, 1025, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 739, 755-56.
134. Cf. Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); Conegate, 1986
E.C.R. at 1025, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 755; see discussion supra Part III.B.
135. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION preamble, para. 12.
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prevents the further integration of Member States, the explicit
goal of the EC Treaty. Clarification of the term is therefore
necessary. Otherwise, the justification will remain so amor-
phous that there is no meaning left to the requirements of
article 36.
Moreover, the precedent exists for the Council to direct the
Member States to follow the guidelines it establishes for the
concept of public morality. The precedent comes from the Pub-
lic Policy directive. 1 6 Indeed, if the Council had authority to
so act in 1964, at a relatively primitive period in European
Community development, there should be no question that
over thirty years later, following the adoption of the TEU, the
Council has authority to issue a directive adopting a uniform
approach to issues of public morality.
D. Public Morality and the Patent Conventions of Europe
It is important to note that the public morality exception
is invoked by Member States in situations that do not involve
erotic materials. Otherwise, the usefulness of the discussion in
this Note would be negligible, much as the economic impact of
erotic materials is on the European financial markets. Rather,
public morality is also invoked by Member States as a method
of objecting to patents which rely on new technologies. As
technology further develops, issues with fundamental moral
implications arise, and the law in this area is being outpaced.
These new technologies, and their morality or immorality,
should be approached with Community-wide agreement, in
order to avoid splintering among Member States.
As part of a harmonization directive, the EC in 1973 re-
quired all Member States to join in establishing the European
Patent Convention (EPC)."7 Under the EPC, Ireland, like all
Member States, must agree to respect patents issued in other
Member States.' However, the EPC provides the same res-
ervation as the EC Treaty's article 36, by which Member
States can avoid issuing patents which would run contrary to
domestic moral norms."9 Article 53 specifically provides that
136. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
137. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270.
138. Id. art. 2(2), 13 I.L.M. at 276.
139. Id. art. 53(a), 13 I.L.M. at 286. Article 36 of the EC Treaty also provides
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"[nlo patent must be granted for inventions the publication or
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or mo-
rality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be
so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation
in some or all of the Contracting States."4 ° The ECJ has nev-
er assessed this contorted article;' 4 ' however, examples of the
potential conflicts between national sovereignty and the Com-
munity-wide harmonization of patents do exist, and likely will
be litigated in the near future.
For instance, the recent dispute over the morality of using
fetal tissue for medical research is an especially bitter dispute
in Ireland. The debate arose when Swedish medical research
teams began using the eye tissue of aborted fetuses for the
development of new pharmaceuticals to improve vision in el-
that the protection of commercial and industrial property rights (collectively, intel-
lectual property rights) continues to be governed by the Member States. The ex-
tent to which this prevents Community-wide harmonization of intellectual property
rights has been widely contested, but is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather,
this Note focuses on article 36 only as it relates to public morality. For a discus-
sion of the extent to which intellectual property rights are reserved to the Member
States through article 36, see A. David Demiray, Intellectual Property and the
External Power of the European Community: The New Extension, 16 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 187 (1994); see also E.L.M. VOLKER, BARRIERS TO EXTERNAL AND INTER-
NAL COIMMUNITY TRADE (1993). Other examples of treaties which provide for this
"safety valve" for moral reasons, and which are not discussed here, include the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (commonly
known as the TRIPS agreement), a sub-agreement of the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, art. 27(2), Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUIENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1208; see also International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 32, art. 19(3)(b), SEN. EXEC. DOC. E,
95-2, at 29 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178 (freedom of expression may be limited by
states to protect public morals). These international treaties, however, should be
distinguished from the EC Treaty, which sets as its task the fundamentally differ-
ent goal of future union among Member States.
140. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 137, art. 53(a),
13 I.L.M. at 286; see also id. art. 138(1)(a), 13 I.L.M. at 290 (a patent may be
revoked "if the subject matter of the European patent is not patentable within the
terms of [article 53]"). The concept that an object may be unpatentable because of
its potential to violate morality or ordre public has no counterpart in American
patent law. Apparently it is unique to the European patent regime. See David G.
Scalise & Daniel Nugent, Patenting Living Matter in the European Community:
Diriment of the Draft Directive, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 990, 1014 (1993).
141. The Court of Justice would ostensibly have jurisdiction over matters con-
cerning the EPC, since the court is authorized to rule on "the validity and inter-
pretation of acts of the institutions of the Community." EC TREATY art. 177, para.
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derly patients. In protest, the Irish government has threatened
to invoke the public morality exception in article 53(a) of the
EPC to prohibit recognition of any patents which issue in rela-
tion to the research." And this is but one example. Other
examples of contentious developments involving new technolo-
gies are increasingly common, and range from moral and reli-
gious objections to genetic engineering to the debate over cen-
sorship of pornography on the Internet. 4'
While such issues are thoroughly contentious, and a con-
sensus on their morality or immorality may never be achieved,
the economic impact of the conservative European approach to
patent law is not in debate. Faced with rigid rules and narrow
views of biotechnological research, many of Europe's leading
biotechnology companies have relocated outside the European
Union.' This economic fallout from motivations deeply
based in morality must be assessed, and dealt with at the
Community level to prevent further fiscal flight.
Thus, it is apparent that the public morality exception in
the EPC is equally open to abuse by Member States, and has
the potential to hamper severely the free flow of goods in the
EU. Consequently, any directive passed by the Council should
include measures to harmonize the concept of public morality
with respect to patents. The potential for this harmonization
could be facilitated by recent developments.
While the EPC represents an era of Community law which
predominated before the passage of the TEU, a new patent
scheme reflects the growing interest in (or at least acceptance
of) further harmonization and integration of Member State
law. This new scheme, based in the Community Patent Con-
vention (CPC), 4' still awaiting ratification by all Member
142. See Geraldine Kennedy, Bishops Issue Condemnation of Swedish Report,
IRISH TIMES, Dec. 7, 1995, at 1.
143. See Tom Wilkie, Geneticists Lay Claim to 'God's Creature,' INDEPENDENT
(London), Nov. 20, 1995, at 1 (religious and animal welfare groups objecting to
attempts to patent animals and plants as violative of article 53(a) of the EPC);
1995 O.J. (C 230) 26 (written question to the European Commission regarding the
Internet and public morals); see also Richard U. Hausknecht, Methotrexate and
Misoprostol to Terminate Early Pregnancy, 333 N. ENG. J. MED. 537 (1995) (con-
clusions of study using medical, as opposed to surgical, methods for pregnancy
terminations by combining legally available pharmaceuticals); Jesse Freund,
Gatorade for Vampires, WIRED, Apr. 1996, at 50 (reporting successes in artificial
blood substitutes).
144. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 140, at 991.
145. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, opened for
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States in late 1996,146 would take great steps toward inte-
grating the EU Member States' approaches to intellectual
property. In essence, the CPC will create a central Community
Patent Office (CPO), which will issue Community patents. All
patents issued by the CPO will be valid in all Member States,
and each Member State must fully comply with and respect all
patents issued by the CPO.147 Community patents will have a
unitary character and an equal effect throughout the territory
of the Member States." In addition, all European patents
issued under the old EPC will be transformed into Community
patents. Once transformed, these patents must also be fully re-
spected by Member States.
Thus, issues of patentability arising from moral implica-
tions will be decided at the supranational level of the CPO,
once the CPC has been ratified by all Member States.' If
and when the CPC is ratified by all Member States, it should
fully reflect and incorporate the provisions of the Public Moral-
ity directive. To this end, the CPC's counterpart to the EPC's
article 53(a) should include the same basic Community guide-
lines outlined in the directive for limiting patents based on
public morality objections.
Importantly, a recently proposed EU directive on biotech-
nological patents contained a provision that would have defini-
tively established guidelines on how the concept of "public
morality" should be interpreted. 5 ' Specifically, article 9 of
the directive would have required that any assessment of pub-
lic morality be made in accordance with the principle of pro-
portionality and under guidelines established by the European
signature Dec. 15, 1975, 1976 O.J. (L 17) 1 [hereinafter CPC]. Member States re-
vised the Convention in 1992. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES: IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.3 (Aug. 24, 1995).
146. As of late 1996, only Ireland and Denmark had yet to ratify the CPC, and
both were expected to capitulate in the near future. The newest Member
States-Austria, Sweden, and Finland-all agreed to sign the Convention simulta-
neously with their entry into the EU. See Intellectual Property: European Union
Will Face Important Intellectual Property Issues this Year, Daily Rep. for Execu-
tives (BNA), May 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Drexec File.
147. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 145, § 3.3.
148. See id.
149. See Anthony D. Sabatelli, Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmoniza-
tion, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 579, 598 (1995).
150. See Proposal for Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inven-
tions, Reuter Textline, Dec. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Txtec
File.
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Parliament.' Though the EU dropped the proposed directive
in favor of ensuring the ratification of the CPC,'52 any provi-
sion dealing with public morality in the revised CPC should
utilize the language of article 9 of the biotechnology directive.
In this way, the economic growth expected from breakthroughs
in areas such as biotechnology will not be distributed unevenly
throughout the European Union.
IV. THE POLITICAL NECESSITY OF A PUBLIC MORALITY
DIRECTIVE IN EUROPE
The notion of a directive to unify the way in which Mem-
ber States approach issues of public morality is indeed a con-
troversial one. While commentators in the 1980s were inclined
to dismiss perfunctorily the possibility of Community proposals
directed at the harmonization of the concept of public moral-
ity,.53 the advent of recent further commitments to European
consolidation makes a public morality directive more viable.
The Treaty on European Union, only recently agreed upon, has
created the dual objectives of a political and monetary union of
the Member States. Both of these visionary objectives (indeed
the TEU itself) have met with staunch opposition by less com-
mitted Member States.' While a proposal for a Community-
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See GOMLEY, supra note 98, at 127 (believing Community action on this
point "a thought which is so unlikely as not to be a realistic proposition").
154. The TEU passed by only a narrow margin in many of the more populous
Member States. For example, in France, an original member of the Community,
only 51.5% of the population voted in favor of adoption of the TEU. See Francois
Raitberger, Mitterand Hails "Historic" Maastricht Victory, Reuters, Sept. 20, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ecnews File.
More starkly, Denmark's population initially refused by popular vote to
adopt the TEU. See Andrew Gumbel, Danish EC Vote Puts Mitterand Under Pres-
sure, Reuters, June 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Arcnws File. A
second referendum was quickly held, with minimal changes to the wording of the
referendum, and this time the majority of the people of Denmark voted to adopt
the TEU; the rest of Europe followed suit. See Carolyn Rhodes & Sonia Mazey,
Introduction: Integration in Theoretical Perspective, in 3 THE STATE OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION: BUILDING A EUROPEAN POLITY? 1, 2 (Carolyn Rhodes & Sonia Mazey
eds., 1995). The European Community transformed into the European Union on
January 1, 1994. See Aaron Wildavsky & L.R. Jones, Budgetary Control in a De-
centralized System: Meeting the Criteria for Fiscal Stability in the European Union,
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Winter 1994, at 7, 7. But see Christopher Anderson,
Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity Revisited. Trends in Public Support
for European Integration, in 3 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: BUILDING A
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wide threshold concept of public morality would no doubt meet
with similar resistance, such a directive is necessary to help
achieve implementation of the objectives set by the TEU by
creating, albeit forcibly, a stronger cultural association be-
tween the peoples of the Member States.
What the directive would serve to accomplish would be a
basic bandwidth of morality, outside of which a Member State
could not stray.'55 Once all Member States conform to the
confines of this bandwidth, then the objectives of the directive
would be complete, and the European Union would be a stron-
ger political and social union because of it. The creation of a
determinative bandwidth of public morality, and indeed a
workable definition of that term,"5 6 is central to the creation
of community conscience.'57
The bandwidth is yet to be determined, but its necessity is
evident from the widely disparate and uneven approaches to
public morality currently practiced by the several Member
States. Recall the language of the court in the Casati case.'
EUROPEAN PoLITY? 111, 127-29 (1995) (discussing public opinion polls of the EU,
and the possibility that public support for integration has hit or will hit akceiling).
Indeed, the argument over Danish participation in the EU is far from over. On
August 12, 1996, the Danish Supreme Court ruled that a district court must hear
a complaint brought by 11 Danish citizens who argue that Denmark's membership
in the EU is unconstitutional. See Denmark: Not So Fast, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31-
Sept. 6, 1996, at 43, 43. The issue may not be resolved for another four to five
years, and may derail any further integration efforts made at the Inter-governmen-
tal Conference (IGC) being held during 1996 and 1997. See id.; see also TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION art. N(2) (mandating the 1996 IGC).
Perhaps the most extreme example of opposition to renewed integration
came from Britain, which failed to even poll its population about the TEU. Prime
Minister John Major, fearing an embarrassing defeat if the referendum failed to
pass, pushed the TEU through Parliament. Furthermore, Britain found it neces-
sary to "opt out" of many of the major portions of the TEU, including the goal of
monetary union and major social reforms. See Rhodes & Mazey, supra, at 3. How-
ever, Britain's resistance to integration may crumble as political and monetary
union become a reality in 1999. See The Train Now Stranded in the City of Lon-
don .... ECONOMIST, Aug. 3-9, 1996, at 61.
155. Such a directive would be in conformity with the ultimate purpose of
Council directives, since by their very nature directives "do not replace national
law, but only mandate its content to varying degrees." DINNAGE & MURPHY, supra
note 3, at 119.
156. The term could be defined along the lines of the working definition used
in the proposed biotechnology directive. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
157. See HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALxY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY 36-37 (1996).
158. Case 203/80, Criminal Proceedings Against Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365; see supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
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The ECJ stated that "Community law... sets certain lim-
its ... as regards the control measures which it permits the
Member States to maintain in connection with the free move-
ment of goods ... 9 These "certain limits" for public moral-
ity have never been consistently set by the Community. They
need to be, in order to prevent economic losses due to barriers
to free trade within the EU. The Public Morality directive is
the proper vehicle to create this bandwidth and the "certain
limits" to which the court alluded in Casati.
While the directive can be seen as necessary to achieve the
goal of a more unified EU, the directive must also be feasible.
One factor to consider in the feasibility of the directive is the
continuing solidification of Union policy. It is important to note
that the controlling cases in regards to the public morality
exception in article 36, Henn & Darby and Conegate, were
decided before the renewed push to further integrate the Mem-
ber States. Even Conegate, decided in 1985, was published
prior to two key reaffirmations of European integration.
First, in the late 1980s, the Single European Act (SEA)6 0
encouraged closer interaction in the EC,'6 ' mainly through
what some commentators have called "negative integration," or
the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, workers,
services and capital.'62 The SEA also refers to (without spe-
cifically incorporating the terms of) the European Convention
on Human Rights,'63 and inserts additional provisions into
the original EEC Treaty dealing with the increased harmoniza-
tion of social policy, research, and technological develop-
ment." Second, and more importantly, during the early
1990s the TEU reaffirmed Europe's commitment not only to a
159. Casati, 1981 E.C.R. at 2618, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 396.
160. EEC TREATY (as amended 1987).
161. As set forth in the first article, "[tihe European Communities . . . shall
have as their objective to contribute together to making concrete progress towards
European unity." SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, tit. 1, art. 1.
162. Rhodes & Mazey, supra note 164, at 2.
163. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, done Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
164. See CASEY, supra note 25, at 179-80; see also SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, tit.
HI, art. 30(6)(b) (technological and research cooperation); id. preamble, para. 6
(economic and social cooperation). The SEA also amended the original EEC Treaty
to permit the Council to act by qualified majority as opposed to unanimity, an
important change in what was previously a burdensome process. See EEC TREATY
arts. 28, 59, 70, 84(2) (as amended 1987).
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single economic market, but to a political and monetary union
as well.165
These treaties signal a further willingness to adopt inte-
gration measures in the EU. Moreover, as it has been shown in
this Note, specified reservations to Member States are capable
of being confined to certain requirements. 6 ' Thus, despite
the fact that article 36 specifically allows Member States to
prohibit free trade, and despite the fact that such controversial
directives are rarely issued, precedent exists for the EU to set
guidelines on public morality which Member States must fol-
low. Just as the Public Policy directive in 1964 limited the
degree to which public policy could limit the free flow of per-
sons within the Community, 167 so too could a directive aimed
at limiting the public morality exception be issued to deal with
the various approaches to public morality.
In determining the viability of a public morality directive,
it is useful to recall the language of the Court of Justice in the
Henn & Darby decision. The court stated that "fiun principle, it
is for each Member State to determine in accordance with its
own scale of values and in the form selected by it the require-
ments of public morality in its territory."6 ' One commentator
has noted that the court's statement is prefaced by a quali-
fication. "The use of the words 'in principle' indicates that the
Member States may only exercise their discretion within the
boundaries of a Community-wide conception of public morali-
ty."169 This Community-wide conception is precisely what the
public morality directive would serve to achieve, and it is this
conception that is glaringly omitted from current European
Union law.
One fairly obvious objection to the directive can be easily
dismissed. Such a sinister-sounding piece of legislation, it may
be argued, is merely another example of Eurocrats overriding
the sovereignty of Member States in order to enforce their own
viewpoints. But this is not the case. No enforcement proce-
dures would be incorporated into the directive; rather, the
165. See Rhodes & Mazey, supra note 154, at 2.
166. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
168. Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn & Darby, 1979 E.C.R. 3795, 3813, [1980] 1
C.M.L.R. 246, 272 (emphasis added).
169. OLIVER, supra note 96, at 181.
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directive would serve to create basic guidelines that keep
Member States harmonious in their approach to issues of pub-
lic morality. The directive is not intended to be rigidly formal-
istic, and would go only slightly further than the broad out-
lines of the Public Policy directive; this ability to harmonize
further is made possible through recent integration develop-
ments.
Moreover, the Member States implicitly relinquished some
amount of sovereignty by adopting article 235 of the EC Trea-
ty, which attempts to mirror the language of the Necessary
and Proper clause of the United States Constitution. 7 ° Spe-
cifically, article 235 of the EC Treaty states that "[i]f action by
the Community should prove necessary to attain ... one of the
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided
the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament, take the appropriate measure."1"' Thus, the
Commission could decide that if such a directive was not spe-
cifically viable, the measure could still be passed by invoking
the language of article 235.
Yet it could be argued that such a directive goes beyond
what is necessary under the Treaty to realize the goals of the
Treaty. Article 3b of the EC Treaty states that "[a]ny action by
the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty."'72 However, a public
morality directive could be considered necessary for two rea-
sons, as a means of advancing both the economic and social
cohesion of the Union.
First, and ostensibly most important, as far as economic
cohesion is concerned, this directive would benefit both Ire-
land's struggling economy and the EU in general. The direc-
tive would create a freer market by clearly defining the con-
tours of the public morality exception, while still retaining the
potential for Member States to invoke the exception. Uninhib-
ited commerce is the cornerstone of the TEU, and a public
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 18; see Eric Stein, Towards a European Foreign
Policy? The European Foreign Affairs System from the Perspective of the United
States Constitution, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: METHODS, TOOLS AND INSTI-
TUTIONS 21 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985).
171. EC TREATY art. 235.
172. EC TREATY art. 3b, para. 3.
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morality directive would achieve this, not only in the tradition-
al areas used by Member States to exclude goods, but also in
new technological areas, as shown in Part III.D.
Second, the directive could be considered necessary as a
means of advancing social cohesion. Perhaps the most lasting
ramification of the directive would be its potential to create the
guise of similarity in Europe. Currently, there are some rela-
tively stark differences between the concepts of public morality
in socially liberal Member States such as Sweden, Denmark or
the Netherlands, and a historically conservative Member State
like Ireland. A directive would not necessarily require Ireland
to allow every good sold in those Member States to be sold in
Ireland, but the directive could begin the movement toward
moderation, perhaps on both sides. Thus, Ireland would be
required to open its borders to some objectionable material,
while countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and the Nether-
lands would be required to centralize their stance on morally
objectionable material in other countries, and discourage pro-
duction at home. Clear guidelines established at the Communi-
ty level would create a measure of certainty for manufacturers
and researchers throughout the EU.
Finally, to reiterate the delineations made in Part III.D of
this Note, all Member States could harmonize from the outset
their approach to public morality in the area of emerging tech-
nological advances, including biotechnology. Difficult decisions
about the morality or immorality of important technical
achievements await in the coming years, and a Community-
wide agreement on their moral acceptance is necessary to
maintain free trade in the EU of the twenty-first century. By
including public morality guidelines for these scientific and
technical advances in the directive, the Community can uni-
formly approach sensitive moral issues, yet still reserve to the
Member States a modest measure of sovereignty. In this way,
the vision of the drafters of the TEU would be realized, and
the European states would be moving toward the true goal of
an "ever closer union." "
173. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION preamble, para. 12.
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V. CONCLUSION
The primary benefit of a public morality directive is the
chance it offers to unite the disparate approaches to moral
issues in the Member States, particularly Ireland's erratic view
of public morality. This benefit creates a veil, no matter how
thin, of unanimity, a current necessity in the vacillating EU.
Economic integration must consistently be connected to Com-
munity integration, and such a directive would fulfill that
purpose. As a secondary benefit, a public morality directive
would create a balanced economic and moral approach to po-
tentially divisive new technologies. Centralization is the key to
this directive, and to remain competitive in the global market,
the EU must continue to work towards further centralization,
yet simultaneously preserve measures in the EC Treaty. This
seeming paradox is overcome by the implementation of a mea-
sure of social cohesion heretofore unknown in the Community,
but the final goal of an ever closer Union must be realized. The
adoption of a uniform approach to public morality will not only
serve this purpose by consolidating the gains made in recent
years, but it will also mark the beginnings of a Community-
based conscience, which will further the integration process.
Ultimately, case-by-case decisions of the ECJ may assist in
determining the finer points of the European approach to pub-
lic morality, but in the end these decisions are mere tinkering.
Case law cannot be a substitute for Community legislation.74
The Commission must act by making the difficult, but impor-
tant, decision to propose a public morality directive.
David O'Connor
174. See Dauses, supra note 94, at 230.
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